A review of THE COMING PLAGUE: NEWLY EMERGING DISEASES IN A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE by Laurie Garrett, published in 1994. Chapter 5: Yambuku – EBOLA
The greatest risks to the scientists were accidents
Harder still was the animal work. To find a mysterious microbe, it was necessary to inject samples into mice, guinea pigs, hamsters, and monkeys, all of which were also kept in large glove boxes. The animals didn’t sit still in the grasp of bulky gloved hands, and injections were often a test of wills between scientist and guinea pig. In such a setting the greatest risks to the scientists were accidents, such as cutting oneself with a broken contaminated test tube or receiving an animal bite. Webb had never cut herself, but she had been bitten several times by monkeys that attacked her approaching gloved hands. Fortunately, these monkeys were part of Webb’s Machupo research, and, having already suffered the disease, she was immune.
The excitement and fear surrounding the Zaire outbreak
These Zairian samples, however, tested negative for Machupo, and Webb was acutely aware of the need to work with slow, cautious deliberation. She asked the CDC’s personnel office to find a staff scientist with three key qualifications: fluency in French, strong African experience, and training in epidemiology. The name Joel Breman popped up, but he was knee-deep in another investigation – of Swine Flu. Over the next three weeks he talked almost daily over the phone with Webb, getting a sense of the excitement and fear surrounding the Zaire outbreak.
His lab wasn’t exactly an American-standard P3 facility
Webb’s Marburg speculation prompted an international escalation in scientific security. Thereafter the CDC and Porton Down – the world’s most secure labs in 1976 – received virtually all samples of the mystery agent. At Porton Down it was Geoffrey Platt who handled most of the mystery virus research. His lab wasn’t exactly an American-standard P3 facility; rather it was a uniquely English mix of P3 and P2 elements. Because the British antivivisection movement was quite militant in its opposition to the use of laboratory animals, security in the form of controlling access to Porton Down was very high. Indeed, most British citizens had no idea where the lab was located or what it did.
Platt knew there were dangers
Since 1964 Platt had worked at Porton Down with dangerous viruses, particularly Lassa, taking precautions to protect himself, though the microbes were not kept safely inside glove boxes, as was done at the CDC. His personal protection was limited to a cloth surgical gown, a double layer of latex gloves, and an old World War II-era gas mask that had not been proven to filter out viruses. Every night after work, Platt would scrub his mask with Lysol and spray it with formalin disinfectant. Platt knew there were dangers, especially when working with an unknown, Marburg-like killer.
An effort necessitating over 500 skilled investigators
Platt’s work on the Sudan samples prompted WHO to release, on October 15, a bulletin that closed with these words: “Samples from Sudan and Zaire have revealed the presence of a new virus, morphologically similar to Marburg, but antigenically different.” In a matter of days, what began as a problem in a missionary hospital would involve investigators and military personnel from eight countries, several international organizations, the foreign ministries of at least ten nations and the entire health apparatus of Zaire. Almost overnight, events would snowball into an effort necessitating over 500 skilled investigators, and mobilizing the resources of numerous European and American institutions, all at an indirect cost of over $10 million. Direct costs for the Yambuku investigation alone would exceed $1 million.